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OPINION
                    
COWEN, Circuit Judge.
Heather Kline appeals from the denial of her motion for leave to amend the
complaint as well as the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants, Hamburg
Area School District (“Hamburg”) and Joseph Padasak.  For the following reasons, we
will affirm.  
I.  
In 1997, Kline met Troy Mansfield as a student in his third-grade class.  After
Kline finished the third grade, her contact with Mansfield continued.  In 2001, when
Kline was in the seventh grade, Mansfield was transferred to the Hamburg Area Middle
School to teach sixth grade.
During the 2001-2002 academic year, Kline began to frequently visit Mansfield in
his sixth grade classroom.  These visits occurred before, during and after school.  At one
      Kline specifically asserted that her rights to equal protection and privacy were1
violated.  
3
point in March 2002, Kline was caught in Mansfield’s classroom cutting band rehearsal. 
After this incident, Kline’s seventh grade teachers met and issued a statement that
 “Heather Kline is not allowed to go to Mr. Mansfield’s room for any reason.”  (App.
782a).  
The relationship between Kline and Mansfield became intimate and eventually
sexual during the 2001-2002 academic year.  Kline admits that neither she, nor her
mother, Stephanie J. Arndt, complained to school officials about Kline’s contact with
Mansfield.  Furthermore, no official of Hamburg possessed actual knowledge of the
intimate or sexual nature of the relationship. 
Ultimately, Mansfield was charged with various sexual offenses arising from his
conduct.  In 2004, he pled guilty, and was sentenced to eleven-and-one-half years to
thirty-one years imprisonment.  
II.
In July 2003, Kline filed a complaint against Mansfield, Hamburg and
Padasak (principal of Hamburg Area Middle School).  She alleged sexual harassment
against all of the Defendants in violation of Title IX; violations of 42 U.S.C. § 19831
4against all of the Defendants; intentional infliction of emotional distress against
Mansfield; respondeat superior liability against Hamburg; and sexual assault and battery
against Mansfield.  
During discovery, Kline moved to amend the complaint.  The proposed amended
complaint asserted similar federal claims against all of the Defendants; sexual assault and
battery against Mansfield; and negligence against Mansfield.  Within her federal claims,
Kline sought to add specific substantive due process language.  In September 2004, the
District Court denied the motion to amend without prejudice.  The District Court stated
that Kline could refile a motion for leave to amend the complaint.
In December 2004, Kline filed a second motion for leave to file an amended
complaint.  Most important for purposes of this appeal, Kline again sought to include
specific language of her substantive due process rights.  In September 2005, the District
Court denied the motion for leave to amend the complaint, observing that “portions of the
new averments [were] futile” while “other portions seem to simply state more specifically
the nature of plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims.”  (App. 32a.)  After noting that the “new
averments as to special relationship [between Kline and the school were] futile” in light
of our decision in D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical School, 972 F.2d
1364 (3d Cir. 1992)(en banc), the District Court went on to conclude as follows:
The general averment contained in the Section 1983 Count of
the initial complaint reads: “[a]ll Defendants had a duty to
provide and ensure an educational environment for the minor,
Heather, free of sexual innuendo, intimidation and harassment
5and to enforce the regulations, rules and laws necessary to
protect the minor, Heather, from the acts of sexual abuse. 
(Complaint, paragraph 38 at page 7.)”  
Defendants did not object to the language, nor in fact raise
any objections to Plaintiff’s complaint, instead choosing to
file an answer to it.  In the proposed amended complaint,
plaintiff includes this same paragraph but includes a few
additional paragraphs averring that the responding defendants
failed to have policies and training to protect minors from
abuse.  Defendants argue that they were not prepared for
claims of failure to train and inadequate policy, and they have
not conducted discovery into these issues.  Defendants argue
that inclusion of these claims in the proposed amended
complaint mark a change in legal theories.
From our review of the initial complaint, several paragraphs
within the initial complaint do either refer to or imply such
claims.  Paragraph 16 of the initial complaint references the
school district’s “rules, polices and regulations” and that other
teachers made Mr. Padasak aware that Mr. Mansfield’s
conduct was violating those policies.  Paragraph 20 of the
initial complaint avers that Mr. Padasak had the authority to
train his employees, including defendant.  Paragraph 25 of the
initial complaint avers that the District knew or should have
known of the inappropriate relationship and that neither took
any steps to address it. 
These averments are sufficient to put the responding
defendants on notice that their policies and practices could
form part of plaintiff’s cause of action.  Accordingly, denial
of plaintiff’s motion does not automatically preclude any
evidence on the inadequacy of training or policies, because
these claims are either explicit or can be inferred from the
initial complaint to which there was no objection.
(App. 32a-33a.)
Hamburg and Padasak eventually moved for summary judgment.  The District
      The District Court also granted summary judgment in favor of Mansfield on the2
federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. 
Kline does not appeal these decisions.  
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Court granted the motion in September 2006.   See Kline ex rel. Arndt v. Mansfield, 4542
F. Supp. 2d 258 (E.D. Pa. 2006).  While the District Court read the prior opinion denying
the motion for leave to file an amended complaint as precluding any constitutional claims
other than Kline’s equal protection and right to privacy claims, it nevertheless did address
and grant summary judgment in favor of the Appellees on Kline’s theory of a municipal
policy or practice of deliberate indifference to the risk of sexual abuse and an alleged
failure to train.  Kline appealed this judgment as well as the District Court’s order
denying her motion for leave to file an amended complaint.  
III.
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the
denial of a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion.  See Lake v. Arnold, 232
F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)(citation omitted).  We exercise plenary review over a
District Court’s order granting summary judgment.  See Lexington Ins. Co. v. W. Pa.
Hosp., 423 F.3d 318, 322 n.2 (3d Cir. 2005).
IV.
A.  Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint
Kline argues that the District Court abused its discretion in denying the motion for
leave to file an amended complaint.  If the District Court had denied Kline the
      Because we find that the District Court analyzed Kline’s substantive due process3
claims on the merits, we need not reach Kline’s argument that the District Court violated
the law of the case doctrine.  
      The District Court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on4
Kline’s equal protection and right to privacy claims.  Kline does not appeal the decisions
regarding those claims.  
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opportunity to proceed on the “policy or practices” and “failure to train” claims she
sought to pursue, we would agree that the District Court abused its discretion.  The
proposed amended complaint, in that regard, was not futile, and, as the District Court
ruled, would not have prejudiced the Appellees.  As we read the District Court’s order
denying the motion for leave to amend the complaint, however, it properly concluded that
both of those claims were at least implicitly included in the original complaint.  It allowed
those claims to go forward.  
In any event, Kline has no cause to complain about the process in the District
Court.  The only two claims that she wishes to litigate on appeal were considered by the
District Court when the Appellees moved for summary judgment and were resolved on
the merits.  The fact that the District Court did not expressly recognize them as
“substantive due process” claims is immaterial.  Given that we have a final judgment on
those claims, we can now proceed to address them on the merits.     3
B.  Kline’s Substantive Due Process Claims4
Kline raised two substantive due process claims.  First, she asserted that Hamburg
had a policy or custom of deliberate indifference towards her sexual abuse.  Second,
8Kline asserted that Hamburg failed to properly train its employees to recognize
and report signs of sexual abuse.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor
of Hamburg on both of these claims.  We consider each of these claims in turn.     
i.  Policy/Custom of Inaction
Kline argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment because
there were material issues of fact regarding whether Hamburg had a custom or policy of
deliberate indifference that violated her constitutional right to be free from sexual abuse. 
In Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978), the Supreme Court stated that a municipality can be liable under Section 1983 if
its policy or custom causes a constitutional injury.  With respect to a sexual abuse claim:
[i]n order to establish liability a plaintiff must demonstrate
both that the defendant’s policy, practice, or custom played an
affirmative role in bringing about the sexual abuse and that
the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that abuse. 
In order to establish deliberate indifference on the part of the
defendant, “something more culpable [must be shown] than a
negligent failure to recognize [a] high risk of harm” to
plaintiffs.
Black by Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985 F.2d 707, 712-13 (3d Cir. 1993)(quoting
Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 946 F.2d 1017, 1025 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Kline conceded that neither she, nor her mother, complained to any school official
about Mansfield’s conduct.  Instead, Kline based her claim on the knowledge that school
officials possessed regarding the contacts between her and Mansfield.  For example,
Kline noted that she was suspended from school after she skipped band rehearsal to be
      On appeal, Kline compares her case to Stoneking v. Bradford Area School District,5
882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), Craig v. Lima City Schools Board of Education, 384 F.
Supp. 2d 1136 (N.D. Ohio 2005) and C.M. v. Southeast Delco School District, 828 F.
Supp. 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  These cases are all distinguishable.  In Stoneking, the record
revealed complaints about sexual assaults of female students by teachers and staff.  The
vice-principal recorded these allegations in a secret file at home rather than in the
teachers’ personnel file.  See Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 728-29.  Additionally, the defendants
continued to give the teachers excellent performance evaluations and discouraged and/or
intimidated parents from pursuing their complaints.  See id.  Unlike Stoneking, the record
in this case did not show that the school officials had notice of any sexual misconduct.  
Craig and C.M. are also similarly distinguishable.  In Craig, teachers saw the plaintiff go
into her teacher’s classroom with the lights out, the door closed and the shades drawn. 
Teachers also saw the plaintiff and her sexual abuser go to his van alone and leave school
property together on a daily basis.  The two would sit together on bus trips and cuddle
underneath a blanket and fall asleep against one another.  Furthermore, once the
superintendent found out about the relationship between the teacher and the plaintiff, he
wrote a memo and entitled it, “consensual sex.”  See Craig, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 1148.  In
C.M., the District Court noted that there was a student complaint about a teacher and that
staff members complained to school officials that the teacher was a “depraved and
dangerous” man.  These complaints also disclosed the sexual overtones of the teacher’s
behavior.  See 828 F. Supp. at 1185.   
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with Mansfield in his classroom.  She also noted that teachers complained that she was
spending too much time with Mansfield in his classroom.  Furthermore, she stated that
her seventh grade teachers stated at one point that she was not to be in Mansfield’s room
for any reason.  Finally, Kline stated that the school failed to enforce its policy of not
allowing seventh grade students in the sixth grade hallway.
Kline’s evidence does not create a material issue of fact that Hamburg was
deliberately indifferent.  At best, it shows that Hamburg might have been negligent in
failing to recognize a high risk of harm.    However, this does not establish a material5
issue of fact with respect to this claim.  See id., cf., Shepard v. Kemp, 912 F. Supp. 120,
      Much of the analysis supporting summary judgment for Hamburg also supports6
summary judgment for Padasak.  In particular, Padasak knew only that Kline spent time
in Mansfield’s classroom when she was scheduled to be elsewhere.  There is no record
evidence that prior to Mansfield’s eventual arrest, Padasak knew or should have known
that Mansfield ever sexually abused Kline.  Padasak’s actions, therefore, do not amount to
deliberate indifference to Kline’s constitutional rights.
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127-28 (M.D. Pa. 1995)(noting that officials were aware of reports that children were
spending inordinate amount of time with teacher, but that there was no disclosure of any
wrongdoing).  Therefore, the District Court properly granted summary judgment in favor
of the Defendants on this claim.6
ii.  Failure to Train
Next, Kline asserts that Hamburg failed to properly train its employees to spot and
report signs of sexual abuse.  “[I]n the absence of an unconstitutional policy, a
municipality’s failure to properly train its employees and officers can create an actionable
violation of a party’s constitutional rights under § 1983.”  Reitz v. County of Bucks, 125
F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997)(citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). 
Failure to train can be the basis for Hamburg’s liability if the failure to train reflects a
deliberate or conscious choice by Hamburg.  See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389.  To
attach liability to Hamburg, the identified deficiency in the training program must be
closely related to the ultimate injury.  See id. at 391.  Proving that an injury could have
been avoided if a school official had better or more training is not enough to show
municipal liability.  See id.  Otherwise, “[s]uch a claim could be made about almost any
11
encounter resulting in injury.”  Id.
“Establishing municipal liability on a failure to train claim under § 1983 is
difficult.”  Reitz, 125 F.3d at 145.  “Failure to train . . . municipal employees can
ordinarily be considered deliberate indifference only where the failure has caused a
pattern of violations.”  See Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 276 (3d Cir.
2000)(per curiam)(citing Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397, 408-09 (1997)).  While it is possible to maintain a failure to train claim without
showing a pattern, the Supreme Court has stated that the burden on a plaintiff in such a
case is high.  City of Canton “did not foreclose the possibility that evidence of a single
violation of federal rights, accompanied by a showing that a municipality has failed to
train its employees to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such
a violation, could trigger municipal liability.”  Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 409.  Indeed,
the Supreme Court noted [in the context of a failure to train law enforcement case]:
in a narrow range of circumstances, a violation of federal
rights may be a highly predicable consequence of a failure to
equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle
recurrent situations.  The likelihood that the situation will
recur and the predictability that an officer lacking specific
tools to handle that situation will violate citizens’ rights could
justify a finding that policymakers’ decision not to train an
officer reflected “deliberate indifference” to the obvious
consequence of the policymakers’ choice - namely, a violation
of a specific constitutional or statutory right.
      For example, arming police officers without training them in the constitutional limits7
of using the arms is an example of deliberate indifference to an obvious risk.  See Berg,
219 F.3d at 276 (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10).  
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Id.   Kline raised her failure to train claim under both theories.   7
First, Kline argues that additional training was necessary given the rampant sexual
misconduct that was occurring within the School District.  Kline’s evidence does not
create a material issue of fact that there was a pattern of sexual abuse such that Hamburg
was deliberately indifferent in failing to institute additional training to its staff.  Upon
reviewing the record, Kline’s pattern evidence is far too attenuated from her
circumstances to show that there was a pattern of sexual abuse that necessitated Hamburg
institute training to its employees to spot signs of sexual abuse.  Furthermore, Kline’s
reliance on instances of possible sexual abuse that were unknown to Hamburg is also
misplaced.    Because this evidence was unknown, the failure to train school officials
could not be perceived as a conscious or deliberate choice on Hamburg’s part.  See City
of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389.  Finally, Kline relies on the evidence of her expert, Dr. Kent. 
Dr. Kent stated that additional training might have prevented Kline from being sexual
abused by Mansfield.  This evidence does not create a material issue of fact with respect
to this claim.  Indeed, as previously stated, the fact that further training might have
prevented constitutional injury, does not, in and of itself establish a failure to train claim. 
See id. at 392.  
Because Kline failed to show that Hamburg’s failure to train its officials to spot
13
signs of sexual abuse caused a pattern of sexual abuse, she can only proceed under the
narrow theory described in Bryan County.  In support of this theory, Kline relies on
Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cr. 1992).  Walker is distinguishable. 
Walker involved a motion to dismiss as opposed to summary judgment.  The plaintiff in
that case alleged that the police department failed to train and supervise police officers in
their obligation not to commit or suborn perjury.  See id. at 298.  The Second Circuit
reversed, not on the narrow theory described in Bryan County, but because the plaintiff
should have been allowed to show a pattern of police misconduct.  See Walker, 974 F.2d
at 299-300.  It stated that because not committing perjury was obvious to all without any
further training or supervision, the failure to train was generally not so likely to produce a
wrong decision supporting an inference of deliberate indifference by the city in the need
to train or supervise.  See id.
Unlike Walker, Kline was given the opportunity to show a pattern of sexual abuse. 
For the reasons previously stated, she failed to show such a pattern.  Additionally,
because not committing the crime of sexually abusing a child is obvious, the failure of
Hamburg to train its employees to spot signs of sexual abuse such as Mansfield’s
“grooming” methods was not deliberately indifferent.  See, e.g., id. at 299-300.  
Finally, Kline argued that Hamburg failed to train its employees on reporting
sexual abuse.  However, there is no evidence that any school official knew of the sexual
abuse that was occurring between Mansfield and Kline.  Therefore, the District Court
14
properly entered summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on Kline’s failure to train
claim.    
V.
In conclusion, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor
of Hamburg and Padasak on Kline’s substantive due process claims.  We will affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
